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ABSTRACT 
Research suggests that job loss can cause illness and 
premature death. This raises the question of whether 
unemployment benefit programs, which aim to alleviate the 
financial stress of job loss, can protect the health of 
the unemployed. To investigate the impact of unemployment 
benefits on health after job loss, we used data from 1984 
to 2009 from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). 
We found that receiving unemployment benefits 
significantly reduces the probability of reporting poor 
health in the year after job loss by around 5 percentage 
points. The health promoting effects of unemployment 
benefits are robust across multiple model specifications 
and controls for pre-existing differences between benefit 
recipients and non-recipients. Our results add to an 
increasing body of literature that suggests that social 
policies can have unanticipated health effects.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Growing evidence suggests that job loss can lead to 
increased probability of illness and premature death (1-
7). This raises the question of whether unemployment 
benefit programs, which aim to alleviate the financial 
stress of job loss, could themselves have unintended 
consequences for health. If the detrimental health 
effects of unemployment are in part due to income loss 
and financial insecurity, unemployment benefits may offer 
a mechanism to prevent or reduce some of the negative 
health effects of job loss. Although unemployment benefit 
programs are not explicitly designed to improve health, a 
number of recent studies have demonstrated that social 
policies not motivated by health concerns, such as the 
earned income tax credit, US welfare reform and the food 
stamp program, have both positive and negative 
consequences for health (8-11).  
 
The US Federal-State Unemployment Insurance Program 
provides temporary wage replacement for eligible workers 
who become unemployed through no fault of their own. Each 
state operates its own program but must follow certain 
general rules established by the Federal Government 
relating to coverage and eligibility. Most research on 
this program has focused on impacts on earnings, 
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consumption and unemployment duration (12-14), but few 
studies have examined potential health consequences.  
 
Identifying the effect of unemployment benefits on health 
is challenging, however, due to strong selection into job 
loss as well as unemployment benefit receipt and 
duration. Individuals in poor health are not only more 
likely to experience an unemployment spell than 
comparatively healthier workers (15, 16); given strict 
eligibility requirements to qualify for benefits, they 
are also likely to differ from unemployed non-recipients 
in a number of key characteristics associated with 
health, such as income and education (17, 18). 
 
While some studies suggest that unemployment benefits may 
ameliorate some of the negative health effects of job 
loss (19-21), prior studies have not accounted for pre-
existing differences between benefit recipients and non-
recipients. A potential concern is therefore that benefit 
recipients are a priori in comparatively better health 
than their non-recipient counterparts.  
 
In this study, we use 20 survey waves of the Panel Study 
of Income Dynamics (PSID) from 1984 to 2009 to 
investigate the impact of unemployment benefits on the 
probability of reporting poor health after job loss. We 
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test this hypothesis in various model specifications 
(including propensity score matching and two-stage least 
squares) that aim to adjust for the bias arising from 
pre-existing differences between benefit recipients and 
non-recipients. While neither approach can fully 
establish that unemployment benefits have a causal effect 
on health, these methodological approaches partly address 
concerns of selection in earlier studies. Findings may be 
useful for policy makers and health practitioners 
considering the potential health implications of future 
reforms to unemployment benefit programs and similar 
social protection policies.   
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2. BACKGROUND 
Unemployment benefit programs may influence the health of 
displaced workers through several mechanisms. In the 
short term, benefits compensate for the loss of earnings 
associated with job loss and smooth consumption during 
unemployment spells (12). This may enable workers to 
purchase health-promoting goods and services such as 
healthy food and health insurance coverage, as well as 
reduce some of the psychosocial stress associated with 
financial losses. On the other hand, unemployment 
benefits may reduce the marginal incentive to search for 
a job, increasing the incidence and duration of non-
employment (14, 22-24). This could lead to skill 
depreciation and negative career effects, which may be 
detrimental for health in the long-run.  
 
A small number of studies have examined the impact of 
unemployment benefits on health. Rodriguez used data from 
the United States, Germany and Britain and found that 
unemployed workers receiving different types of 
government entitlement benefits (including unemployment 
benefits) reported similar health status as full-time 
employed workers, suggesting that such support programs 
can buffer the health effects of job loss (Rodriguez 
2001). Other studies have reported protective effects of 
government entitlement benefits for depression symptoms 
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among unemployed women (25); poor self-rated health among 
minimum and medium skill level jobs (21); and poor mental 
health among unemployed workers in Spain (26). While most 
of these studies find a positive association between 
unemployment benefits and health, a key limitation is the 
lack of attention to selection.  
 
Job losers do not automatically qualify to receive 
unemployment benefits, but rather, must meet several 
monetary and non-monetary eligibility criteria (27). 
Displaced workers must also file claims with state 
unemployment benefit agencies to receive benefits. An 
implication is that not all eligible displaced workers 
actually claim benefits. In fact, unemployment benefit 
programs in the United States have historically had low 
take-up rates, with 34.8% of the unemployed applying for 
benefits in 2005 and only 23.9% actually receiving 
benefits, according to data from the Current Population 
Survey (CPS) (18). 51.9% of the unemployed who did not 
apply for unemployment benefits did so because they 
believed themselves to be ineligible; 17.8% did not apply 
because of reasons related to attitude, lack of 
understanding or other barriers; and 5.3% reported that 
they did not apply because they were retired, ill or 
disabled.  
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Because of eligibility rules and the need to apply for 
benefits, several important differences arise between 
unemployed individuals who receive benefits and those who 
do not.  Compared to non-recipients, unemployed workers 
receiving unemployment benefits are more likely to be 
educated, higher-earners and to have previously received 
benefits (17). This selection makes it particularly 
challenging to establish whether unemployment benefits 
have an impact on health. prior studies have not fully 
accounted for these pre-existing differences between 
benefit recipients and non-recipients. A potential 
concern is that benefit recipients are in comparatively 
better health than their non-recipient counterparts prior 
to receiving benefits. Recent studies circumvent this 
problem by exploiting variations in state unemployment 
benefit program design (28, 29). However, these studies 
did not incorporate information on receipt of benefits at 
the individual level, making it unclear whether receiving 
unemployment benefits plays a critical role in the causal 
pathway linking job loss and health. The present study 
aims to shed light on this question and address some of 
the limitations from previous studies by applying 
multiple modelling strategies using a longitudinal sample 
representative of the United States population.  
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3. METHODS 
 
3.1 Data 
 
We use data from the PSID, the longest running 
longitudinal household survey in the world, which 
collects data on employment status, demographics, and 
health (30). Data were collected annually up until 1997, 
after which the PSID shifted to a biennial design. The 
analysis presented is based on the sample of unemployment 
spells experienced by working-age (18-65 years old) heads 
of household from the 1984 (the year health measures were 
introduced) through 2009 survey waves. Observations with 
missing data were excluded from the analysis leaving a 
sample of 4,247 unemployment spells, 875 of which 
received unemployment benefits (results from a sample of 
all unemployment spells yielded similar results).  
 
The PSID measures health using the self-rated health 
item, a subjective indicator that captures individuals’ 
perceptions of their health using Likert scales. 
Respondents are asked to rate their own health on a scale 
ranging from ‘excellent’ (1) to ‘very good’ (2), ‘good’ 
(3), ‘fair’ (4), and ‘poor’ (5). We collapse the scale 
into a binary variable, where categories 4 and 5 indicate 
poor health. This binary indicator has been shown to be a 
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strong predictor of objective measures of health, 
including the risk of death (31-33).  
 
We extracted data on employment status from each survey 
wave. Based on available information we constructed 
binary variables that indicate whether an unemployment 
spell occurred at some point in the previous year, and 
whether the individual received unemployment benefits 
following that spell.  
 
Other variables used in the analysis include age, gender, 
race (white, black, other), education level (high school, 
college, above), marital status (married, single, 
separated, divorced, widowed), and household size. Two 
other individual level variables were lagged by 2 years: 
the binary indicator of poor health and the natural log 
of family income. Income is lagged to avoid simultaneity 
with job loss. Both variables were lagged by two years to 
keep the models consistent when the survey changed from 
an annual to biennial design. Lagging income and health 
is important to attempt to account for some of pre-
existing individual characteristics that predict both 
unemployment benefit receipt and health. To control for 
state-specific labor market conditions that may affect 
individual employment and health (34), we also used the 
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state unemployment rate for the working-age population 
calculated from the CPS.  
 
3.2 Methods 
 
We estimated linear probability models (results were 
similar for logistic regression models) to estimate the 
effects of unemployment benefits on self-reported health 
among the pool of unemployed working-age respondents, 
controlling for individual characteristics, including 
health status and household income prior to job loss, as 
well as state characteristics. To test the robustness of 
our results, we estimated two alternative models that aim 
to further account for pre-existing differences between 
unemployment benefit recipients and non-recipients. 
 
First, we implemented one-to-one nearest neighbor 
propensity score matching models (35). Propensity score 
matching is a statistical matching technique that seeks 
to create treatment and control groups comprised of 
individuals that share comparable observable 
characteristics. We match each unemployment benefit 
recipient in the PSID sample to an unemployed non-
recipient that shares similar individual level 
characteristics in the year prior to job loss (as 
described above) and was unemployed during comparable 
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state labor market conditions (see Appendix for further 
description of the method)(36). 
 
However, even matched estimates may be biased by 
unobserved individual level differences. To further test 
the robustness of our results, we estimated two-stage 
least squares (instrumental variable) models that exploit 
variation in the likelihood of receiving unemployment 
benefits based on whether job loss occurred due to a 
business closure. The rationale for this approach is that 
business closures are generally unrelated to the 
characteristics of an individual worker. Since Federal 
Unemployment Insurance Program rules require benefit 
recipients to have lost their job through no fault of 
their own, individuals who experience job loss due to a 
business closure are more likely to receive unemployment 
benefits than individuals who lost their job for other 
reasons. We can therefore estimate the health effects of 
receiving unemployment benefits among a subsample of 
unemployed individuals who have greater probability of 
receiving unemployment benefits for reasons that are 
presumably unrelated to their prior health. We employ a 
two-stage least squares modelling approach where we 
instrument for unemployment benefit receipt using 
information on whether job loss was due to a business 
closure, first using the full pool of unemployment spells 
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experienced by heads of household in the PSID during the 
sample period, and then using the propensity score 
matched subsample (see Appendix for further description 
of the methods)(36).   
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4. RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Exhibit 1 shows descriptive statistics for the full 
sample of unemployment spells. There are some important 
differences between unemployment benefit recipients and 
non-recipients. Benefit recipients are more likely to be 
married, white, male, and/or have had comparatively 
higher household incomes, which is consistent with 
evidence from official government sources (17). By 
contrast, non-benefit recipients are more likely to be 
single and/or black. Unemployed individuals are more 
likely to receive benefits if they are jobless in states 
and years with higher unemployment rates.  
 
<Exhibit 1. Descriptive statistics for the sample of 
unemployment spells>  
 
Non-benefit recipients are also more likely to report 
poor health than unemployment benefit recipients, both in 
the year before job loss (21.2% compared to 15.3%, t-
value=3.99) and in the year after job loss (25.8% 
compared to 18.4%, t-value=4.72) (Exhibit 2). Compared to 
benefit recipients, a slightly greater percentage of non-
recipients who previously did not report poor health in 
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the year before job loss reported poor health in the year 
after job loss (12.0% compared to 10.9%, t-value=0.94) 
(Data not shown).  
 
 
<Exhibit 2. Percentage of individuals reporting poor 
health, before and after job loss>  
 
4.2 Model results 
 
Exhibit 3 summarizes the main results of two models that 
estimate the effect of unemployment benefit receipt on 
the probability of reporting poor health (full results 
from all models can be found in Appendix Table A1)(36). 
Simple unadjusted linear probability models that control 
only for poor health in the year before job loss suggest 
that receiving unemployment benefits is associated with a 
significant reduction of 4.6 percentage points in the 
probability of reporting poor health (Data not shown). In 
a linear probability model that controls for poor health 
in the year prior to job loss, marital status, race, 
education, household size, age, gender, household income 
in the year prior to job loss, state unemployment rates 
and state and year fixed effects, the estimate remains 
consistent, indicating that receipt of unemployment 
benefits is associated with a 4.7 percentage point 
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significant reduction in the probability of reporting 
poor health (95% Confidence Interval: -7.5, -1.8) 
(Exhibit 3, column 1). 
 
< Exhibit 3. Estimated effects of unemployment benefit 
receipt on probability of poor health, main model 
results> 
 
A potential concern is that ex-ante differences between 
unemployment benefit recipients and non-recipients could 
bias the results, even after controlling for observable 
individual and state-level characteristics. We therefore 
estimated propensity score matching models. This left us 
with a matched sample of unemployment spells that does 
not reveal significant differences between the 
unemployment benefit and non-recipient groups in 
observable individual characteristics in the year prior 
to job loss (Appendix Exhibit A2)(36). The standardized 
bias is reduced considerably across the sample and across 
all covariates (Appendix Exhibit A3 and A4) (36). 
 
The second column of Exhibit 3 summarizes estimated 
effects of unemployment benefit receipt based on the 
propensity score matched sample. Using this matched 
sample of benefit recipients and non-recipients, the 
fully-adjusted linear probability model indicates that 
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unemployment benefits reduce the probability of reporting 
poor health by 3.0 percentage points (95% Confidence 
Interval: -6.6, 0.5). We find no statistically 
significant difference in the estimated effects of 
unemployment benefits between the two models shown, since 
the 95% confidence intervals estimated from the 
propensity score matched sample fully overlap with those 
estimated using the full sample. 
  
As an additional robustness check, we estimated two-stage 
least square models that examine effects of unemployment 
benefits among those whose likelihood of receiving 
benefits is influenced by the fact that they lost their 
job due to a business closure. Results from the first 
stage indicate that workers losing their job due to 
business closure were significantly more likely to 
receive benefits. Among the pool of all unemployment 
spells, controlling for individual characteristics, 
losing a job due a business closure increases the 
probability of receiving unemployment benefits 
significantly by 15.8 percentage points (Appendix Exhibit 
A5)(36). Workers who lost their job due to a business 
closure, however, did not systematically differ compared 
to workers losing their job for other reasons in terms of 
health prior to job loss and other observable 
characteristics (Appendix Exhibit A6)(36).  
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The two right columns of Exhibit 4 show second-stage 
estimates from the two-stage least squares models. In 
line with our original models, unemployment benefits 
significantly reduce the probability of poor self-
reported health. Although the magnitudes of the point 
estimates are large, the estimates are less precise and 
do not significantly differ from those in our original 
two models presented in Exhibit 3. Given the lack of 
precision, the magnitude of the effect should be 
cautiously interpreted, and emphasis should be on the 
direction of effect. Estimates may also not be 
generalizable to the broader unemployed sample since they 
reflect the local average treatment effect among the 
business closure subsample. Overall, however, results 
from 2SLS models are consistent with those from the two 
other modelling approaches and suggest that unemployment 
benefits are associated with better health among workers 
experiencing job loss.  
 
<Exhibit 4. Estimated effects of unemployment benefit 
receipt on probability of poor health, all model results, 
95% confidence intervals> 
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5. DISCUSSION 
 
Estimating the health effects of unemployment benefits is 
challenging because recipients are often a priori better-
off than those who do not receive unemployment benefits. 
Inferring causal effects by comparing the health of 
benefit recipients with non-recipients therefore requires 
great care. In this paper we use a variety of modelling 
strategies to examine the impact of unemployment benefits 
on the health of the unemployed. Although we still cannot 
claim a causal link between unemployment benefits and 
health, the estimates consistently indicate that 
unemployed individuals who receive benefits are at lower 
risk of reporting poor health in the year following job 
loss than comparable unemployed individuals who do not 
receive unemployment benefits.   
 
Our objective was to examine whether unemployment 
benefits may potentially influence the health of the 
unemployed. Yet, the pre-existing health, wealth and 
educational differences between benefit recipients and 
non-recipients are themselves policy relevant, as they 
indicate significant inequalities in access to benefits. 
Unemployment benefits smooth consumption and provide an 
opportunity to search for suitable new employment (12, 
37). Therefore, the observed socio-economic differences 
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between benefit recipients and non-recipients are 
themselves of concern as they suggest that the program 
disproportionately benefits socioeconomically advantaged 
workers more than it benefits vulnerable workers from 
lower socioeconomic status.  
	
Unemployment benefits may affect health through income by 
helping to maintain consumption patterns or reducing 
financial stress, or through time by subsidising leisure. 
Income is a well-known health determinant (38); there are 
a multitude of ways by which income could affect health. 
For example, income may allow individuals to consume 
healthy goods and services, such as fruits and vegetables 
that are often more expensive than unhealthy foods (39). 
Income may also enable the unemployed to access health 
care. In our United States sample, most individuals who 
experienced job loss were also likely to lose access to 
their employer-based health insurance. However, while 
individuals who lose their job are able to keep their 
employer-based health insurance under the Consolidated 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985, they 
are responsible for paying the full insurance premium, 
making insurance only accessible to those with financial 
liquidity. A review found that only 14% of eligible 
individuals maintained their employer-based insurance 
coverage in 2010, while 57% became uninsured (40).  
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Income-related health effects of unemployment benefits 
may alternatively occur through some non-consumption 
related pathway that is still a result of the short-term 
income subsidy provided by benefits. For example, it is 
possible that unemployment benefits may have an 
independent psychological effect by providing comfort and 
security to job losers. 
 
Although income may play an important role, there are 
alternative explanations for the impact of unemployment 
benefits on health. The canonical Grossman model of 
demand for health posits that demand for time-intensive 
health promoting activities will increase as the price of 
engaging in these activities decreases (41). Time spent 
working increases income, which allows individuals to 
purchase health inputs such as healthy food, but at the 
same time, working reduces time to invest in health 
promoting activities like exercise, or may even harm 
health as a result of exposure to adverse working 
conditions. Individuals who are not working, however, may 
have more leisure time available that can be used for 
health promoting, time consuming activities like 
exercise. Unemployment benefits may therefore protect 
health by subsidizing time out of work and providing the 
unemployed with additional time to engage in health 
 24 
promoting leisure activities. This notion is consistent 
with research suggesting that unemployment benefits may 
lengthen unemployment duration by underwriting leisure 
time (23, 42).  
 
Our results also offer some insight into the potential 
mechanisms linking job loss to health. The finding that 
unemployment benefits improve self-rated health suggests 
that income losses and financial uncertainty are 
potential mechanisms through which unemployment 
influences health. In the absence of benefits, some 
unemployed individuals may feel distressed or be unable 
to pay for health promoting goods and services. 
Unemployment benefits, alternatively, may help the 
unemployed to cope with some of the stress associated 
with financial insecurity.   
 
There are a number of limitations in our study. First, 
the estimated effects of unemployment benefits are only 
generalizable to the sample of heads of households 
included in the analysis. Additionally, while the 
propensity score matching and two-stage least squares 
analyses aim to provide additional evidence on whether 
benefit receipt plays a role in the causal pathway 
linking job loss to health, neither method is able to 
establish causality. In the case of the propensity score 
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matching models, it is possible that the treatment or 
control groups are biased by unmeasured factors that are 
correlated with both benefit receipt and health. 
Likewise, the two-stage least squares analysis estimates 
the effect of receiving unemployment benefits 
specifically among those individuals whose probability of 
receiving benefits is altered by having lost a job due to 
a business closure. The estimate therefore reflects the 
so-called ‘local average treatment effect’ among this 
particular group and may not be generalizable to the 
broader unemployed population. Nevertheless, we believe 
both approaches serve as important tests of the 
relationship between benefit receipt and health. Finally, 
although self-rated health has been shown to be a strong 
predictor of objective measures of health, including the 
risk of death (31-33), data on other indictors of health 
would have provided a more nuanced analysis of the 
potential mechanisms linking benefits to health. 
Unfortunately, PSID did not collect detailed information 
on the incidence and timing of other health outcomes for 
a sufficiently long period.  
 
Overall, this study provides some evidence that receiving 
unemployment benefits may have positive effects on the 
health of the unemployed. These findings are important 
for policy. Policymakers have repeatedly introduced 
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changes to state unemployment benefit program components, 
such as the maximum allowable weekly benefit amount and 
duration of benefit receipt. Our study suggests, however, 
that policy makers need to consider strategies to 
increase the take-up of unemployment benefits among the 
unemployed. For example, a recent policy reform was 
introduced to increase benefit access by altering the 
base period used to calculate eligibility. However, this 
reform has had limited impacts on take-up of state 
benefit programs (43). The relatively low take up of 
benefits may be partly attributable to the stigma 
associated with claiming unemployment benefits, with many 
eligible individuals choosing not to apply, highlighting 
the need of policies to change attitudes towards 
benefits. Likewise, around half of the unemployed are 
unaware of their eligibility (18); increasing awareness 
of unemployment benefit rules, therefore, would be 
crucial to ensure that the programme reaches those in 
greatest need.  
 
During the financial crisis, as unemployment rates rose, 
the United States government responded with an 
unprecedented extension of unemployment insurance 
benefits from the standard 26 week duration to a maximum 
of 99 weeks (44); the Emergency Unemployment Compensation 
program expired at the end of 2013. While there was 
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considerable debate in Congress around the time of 
expiration over whether to continue benefit extensions, 
there is no evidence that the health effects of 
maintaining unemployment benefits were taken into account 
(45). This study suggests that policymakers should 
consider potential health consequences of future 
unemployment benefit extensions, cuts and program 
reforms. 
 
 
  
 28 
REFERENCES 
1. Strully KW. Job loss and health in the U.S. labor market. Demography. 
2009;46(2):221-46. 
2. Gathergood J. An Instrumental Variable Approach to Unemployment, 
psychological health and social norm effects. Health economics. 2012:n/a-n/a. 
3. Martikainen PT, Valkonen T. Excess mortality of unemployed men and 
women during a period of rapidly increasing unemployment. Lancet. 
1996;348(9032):909-12. 
4. Catalano R, Goldman-Mellor S, Saxton K, Margerison-Zilko C, Subbaraman 
M, LeWinn K, et al. The health effects of economic decline. Annual review of public 
health. 2011;32:431-50. 
5. Huijts T, Reeves A, McKee M, Stuckler D. The impacts of job loss and job 
recovery on self-rated health: testing the mediating role of financial strain and 
income. Eur J Public Health. 2015;25(5):801-6. 
6. Schroder M. Jobless now, sick later? Investigating the long-term 
consequences of involuntary job loss on health. Advances in life course research. 
2013;18(1):5-15. 
7. Riumallo-Herl C, Basu S, Stuckler D, Courtin E, Avendano M. Job loss, 
wealth and depression during the Great Recession in the USA and Europe. 
International journal of epidemiology. 2014;43(5):1508-17. 
8. Snyder SE, Evans WN. The Effect of Income on Mortality: Evidence from the 
Social Security Notch. Review of Economics and Statistics. 2006;88(3):482-95. 
9. Almond D, Hoynes HW, Schanzenbach DW. Inside the War on Poverty: The 
Impact of Food Stamps on Birth Outcomes. Review of Economics and Statistics. 
2011;93(2):387-403. 
10. Bitler MP, Gelbach JB, Hoynes HW. Welfare Reform and Health. Journal of 
Human Resources. 2005;40(2):309-34. 
11. Schmeiser MD. Expanding wallets and waistlines: the impact of family 
income on the BMI of women and men eligible for the Earned Income Tax Credit. 
Health Econ. 2009;18(11):1277-94. 
12. Gruber J. The consumption smoothing benefits of unemployment insurance. 
Am Econ Rev. 1997;87(1):192-205. 
13. Card D, Chetty R, Weber A. The spike at benefit exhaustion: Leaving the 
unemployment system or starting a new job? Am Econ Rev. 2007;97(2):113-8. 
14. Katz LF, Meyer BD. The Impact of the Potential Duration of Unemployment 
Benefits on the Duration of Unemployment. J Public Econ. 1990;41(1):45-72. 
15. Bockerman P, Ilmakunnas P. Unemployment and self-assessed health: 
evidence from panel data. Health Econ. 2009;18(2):161-79. 
16. Burgard SA, Brand JE, House JS. Toward a better estimation of the effect of 
job loss on health. Journal of health and social behavior. 2007;48(4):369-84. 
17. United States Government Accountability Office. Unemployment Insurance: 
Factors Associated with Benefit Receipt. 2006 March 2006. Report No. 
18. Vroman W. Unemployment insurance recipients and nonrecipients in the CPS. 
Monthly Labor Review. 2009;October 2009. 
19. Rodriguez E. Keeping the unemployed healthy: the effect of means-tested and 
entitlement benefits in Britain, Germany, and the United States. Am J Public Health. 
2001;91:1403 - 11. 
 29 
20. Rodriguez E, Lasch K, Mead JP. The potential role of unemployment benefits 
in shaping the mental health impact of unemployment. Int J Health Serv. 
1997;27(4):601-23. 
21. McLeod CB, Hall PA, Siddiqi A, Hertzman C. How society shapes the health 
gradient: work-related health inequalities in a comparative perspective. Annual 
review of public health. 2012;33:59-73. 
22. Chetty R. Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment 
Insurance. Journal of Political Economy. 2008;116(2 (April 2008)):173-234. 
23. Moffitt R, Nicholson W. The Effect of Unemployment-Insurance on 
Unemployment - the Case of Federal Supplemental Benefits. Rev Econ Stat. 
1982;64(1):1-11. 
24. Krueger AB, Mueller A. Job search and unemployment insurance: New 
evidence from time use data. J Public Econ. 2010;94(3–4):298-307. 
25. Rodriguez E, Frongillo EA, Chandra P. Do social programmes contribute to 
mental well-being? The long-term impact of unemployment on depression in the 
United States. Int J Epidemiol. 2001;30(1):163-70. 
26. Artazcoz L, Benach J, Borrell C, Cortes I. Unemployment and mental health: 
Understanding the interactions among gender, family roles, and social class. 
American Journal of Public Health. 2004;94(1):82-8. 
27. Department of Labor ETA. Chapter 3, Monetary Entitlement 2009 [Available 
from: 
http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/pdf/uilawcompar/2009/monetary.pdf. 
28. Cylus J, Glymour MM, Avendano M. Health effects of unemployment benefit 
program generosity. American journal of public health. 2015;105(2):317-23. 
29. Cylus J, Glymour MM, Avendano M. Do generous unemployment benefit 
programs reduce suicide rates? A state fixed-effect analysis covering 1968-2008. Am 
J Epidemiol. 2014;180(1):45-52. 
30. Panel Study of Income Dynamics pudPadbtSRC, Institute for Social Research, 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (2015). . 
31. Idler EL, Benyamini Y. Self-rated health and mortality: a review of twenty-
seven community studies. Journal of health and social behavior. 1997;38(1):21-37. 
32. Liang J. Self-Reported Physical Health among Aged Adults. J Gerontol. 
1986;41(2):248-60. 
33. Burstrom B, Fredlund P. Self rated health: Is it as good a predictor of 
subsequent mortality among adults in lower as well as in higher social classes? J 
Epidemiol Community Health. 2001;55(11):836-40. 
34. Ruhm CJ. Are Recessions Good for Your Health? The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics. 2000;115(2):617-50. 
35. Heckman JJ, Ichimura H, Todd P. Matching as an econometric evaluation 
estimator. Rev Econ Stud. 1998;65(2):261-94. 
36. To access the Appendix, click on the Appendix link in the box to the right of 
the article online. 
37. Acemoglu D. Good jobs versus bad jobs. J Labor Econ. 2001;19(1):1-21. 
38. Kawachi I, Adler NE, Dow WH. Money, schooling, and health: Mechanisms 
and causal evidence. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. 2010;1186:56-
68. 
39. Rao M, Afshin A, Singh G, Mozaffarian D. Do Healthier Foods or Diet 
Patterns Cost More Than Less Healthy Options? A Systematic Review and Meta-
Analysis. Circulation. 2013;127(12). 
 30 
40. The Commonwealth Fund. The Commonwealth Fund Biennial Health 
Insurance Survey. 2010. 
41. Grossman M. Concept of Health Capital and Demand for Health. J Polit Econ. 
1972;80(2):223-5. 
42. Chetty R. Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment 
Insurance (April, pg 211, 2008). J Polit Econ. 2008;116(6):1197-. 
43. Gould-Werth A, Shaefer HL, Do Alternative Base Periods Increase 
Unemployment Insurance Benefit Receipt Among Low-Educated Unemployed 
Workers? Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. 2013;32(4):835-852. 
44. Executive Office of the President. Unemployment Insurance Extensions and 
Reforms in the American Jobs Act 2011 [Available from: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ui_report_final.pdf.] 
45. Peters J. Senate Fails to Pass Three-Month Extension of Jobless Aid. New 
York Times. 2014. 
 
  
 31 
EXHIBIT LIST 
EXHIBIT 1 (Table) 
Caption: Descriptive statistics for the sample of 
unemployment spells 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics and Current Population Survey data. 
Notes: SD=Standard deviation 
 
EXHIBIT 2 (Figure) 
Caption: Percentage of individuals reporting poor health, 
before and after job loss 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics data. 
 
EXHIBIT 3 (Table) 
Caption: Estimated effects of unemployment benefit 
receipt on probability of poor health, main model results 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics and Current Population Survey data. 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Models 
include marital status, race, education, number in 
household, age, gender, logged real household income, 
state unemployment rates and state and year fixed 
effects. 
 
EXHIBIT 4 (Figure) 
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Caption: Estimated effects of unemployment benefit 
receipt on probability of poor health, all model results, 
95% confidence intervals  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics and Current Population Survey data. 
Notes: Models include marital status, race, education, 
number in household, age, gender, logged real household 
income, state unemployment rates and state and year fixed 
effects. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
EXHIBIT 1. Descriptive statistics for the sample of 
unemployment spells 
		
Unemployment 
benefit 
recipient 
Non-
unemployment 
benefit 
recipient 
All 
unemployment 
spells 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Male  69.0% 0.5 56.2% 0.5 58.8% 0.5 
Age  40.4 11.2 39.5 13.2 39.7 12.8 
Married  44.1% 0.5 31.4% 0.5 34.0% 0.5 
Single  27.6% 0.4 38.4% 0.5 36.2% 0.5 
Widowed  3.4% 0.2 5.1% 0.2 4.8% 0.2 
Divorced  17.6% 0.4 16.8% 0.4 17.0% 0.4 
Separated  7.3% 0.3 8.2% 0.3 8.0% 0.3 
White 51.6% 0.5 39.4% 0.5 41.9% 0.5 
Black 41.1% 0.5 56.2% 0.5 53.1% 0.5 
Other 6.9% 0.3 3.7% 0.2 4.3% 0.2 
High School 
or less  72.8% 0.4 76.9% 0.4 76.1% 0.4 
College  26.3% 0.4 21.5% 0.4 22.5% 0.4 
Post-
Graduate  0.8% 0.1 1.6% 0.1 1.4% 0.1 
Household 
size  2.9 1.6 2.7 1.7 2.8 1.7 
Total family 
income in 
year before 
unemployment 
spell 
38,149  31,121  30,133  43,496  31,783  41,377  
Working age 
state 
unemployment 
rate in year 
of 
unemployment 
spell 
5.1 1.6 4.7 1.6 4.8 1.6 
Share of 
unemployment 
spell sample 
20.6%   79.4%   100.0%   
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EXHIBIT 2 Percentage of individuals reporting poor 
health, before and after job loss 
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EXHIBIT 3. Estimated effects of unemployment benefit 
receipt on probability of poor health, main model results 
	 	 	  (1) (2) 
 
Linear 
probability 
model (all 
unemployment 
spells) 
Linear 
probability 
model 
(propensity 
score 
matched 
sample) 
Unemployment benefit receipt -0.0466*** -0.0304* 
	
(0.0147) (0.018) 
Poor health in the year prior 
to job loss 0.437*** 0.383*** 
	
(0.0184) (0.0327) 
	 	 	Observations 4,247 1,750 
R-squared 0.237 0.197 
      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
	 	 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Models 
include marital status, race, education, number in 
household, age, gender, logged real household income, 
state unemployment rates and state and year fixed 
effects. 
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EXHIBIT 4 Estimated effects of unemployment benefit 
receipt on probability of poor health, all model results, 
95% confidence intervals  
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Appendix explanation of methodologies 
 
Propensity score matching description 
 
Propensity score matching creates comparable treatment and control 
groups by adjusting for pre-treatment observable differences between a 
group of treated and a group of untreated. 
 
To do this, we first estimate a probit regression that predicts the 
propensity to be included in the treatment group according to a set of 
covariates. That is, we predict the likelihood of being an unemployment 
benefit recipient conditional on health 2 years prior, marital status, 
race, education, household size, gender, household income 2 years 
prior, age, and working-age state unemployment rates in the year of the 
unemployment spell. Using the estimated pscores, we can form a control 
group that is comparable in observable characteristics but did not 
receive benefits. 
 
Comparing the matched treatment and control groups, we see (as shown in 
Appendix Exhibits A2, A3 and A4) that the control group exhibits 
significantly less bias after matching. We then implement linear 
probability and 2SLS models using this matched subsample. 
 
 
Two-stage least squares (instrumental variable) methodological 
description 
 
Our objective is to estimate the average causal effect of UI receipt on 
self-reported health for individuals that experienced job loss in the 
previous year. Alternatively, this can be thought of as the mean effect 
of a treatment on a treated population, where UI is the treatment and 
unemployed non-UI recipients are the control group. The average 
treatment effect is the difference between the two groups, provided 
that unemployed workers in the treatment group are identical to 
unemployed workers in the control group.  
 
We start with the following basic specification: 
 
Δ = E(Yi,1 | UIi,1 = 1) - E(Yi,1 | UIi,1 = 0) 
 
Here, Yi,1 is an unemployed individual’s self-reported health in the 
year after job loss. The parameter Δ captures the difference in health 
between jobless individuals who received UI (UI=1) compared to that of 
jobless individuals who did not received UI (UI=0). 
 
Because we do not observe the counterfactual (i.e. the effect of UI 
receipt for those who did not actually receive UI) we need to identify 
a control group of unemployed non-UI recipients. For an individual i’ 
in the control group (i.e. not in receipt of benefits) with the same 
observed individual characteristics as someone in the treatment group 
who did receive UI, we assume: 
 
E(Yi,1 | Xi,t, Yi,0, UIi,1 = 0) = E(Yi’,1 | Xi’,t, Yi’,0, UIi’,1 = 0) 
 
where X is a vector of characteristics, including age, gender, race, 
education, marital status, household size and previous income level 
pre-job loss; and Yi,0 is self-reported health in a previous time 
Cylus J, Avendano M. Receiving unemployment benefits may have positive effects on the 
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period. We can identify the average UI treatment effect by estimating 
the following naïve equation in a linear probability model that 
controls for many of the observable factors that may differ between the 
treatment and control groups:  
 
Yi,t = α + Xi,tπ + UIi,t-1Δ + S + T + URs,t-1 + εi,t  (1) 
 
Where Yit is health of unemployed individual i at time t, X is a vector 
of control variables associated with receipt of unemployment benefits, 
UI is a binary indicator for whether the individual received UI in the 
previous year, S is a set of State fixed effects, T is a set of year 
fixed effects, UR is the unemployment rate in the State of residence in 
the year of job loss, and ε is the standard error.  
 
The assumption of comparability between UI recipients and non-
recipients, however, is difficult to meet; although many of the 
variables selecting individuals into UI may be captured by X, the 
equation above is insufficient to identify the effect of UI receipt on 
health because UI will be endogenous with health if there are 
additional unobserved characteristics that correlate with both health 
and UI receipt. In this case, OLS may produce biased estimates of the 
causal effect of benefits on health.  
 
To address the potential endogeneity of UI receipt we use a two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) approach that exploits exogenous variation in a 
variable that predicts UI receipt but is not included in the main 
equation predicting poor health, and is not correlated with εi. We 
experimented with a variety of possible instruments, including State 
laws on maximum unemployment benefit levels in a State and year, and 
State-level implementation of a policy that alters the base period used 
to define UI monetary eligibility, known as the Alternate Base Period 
(ABP). However, neither is a sufficiently strong predictor of benefit 
receipt in our PSID sample. In the case of maximum benefit generosity, 
it is possible that the unemployed are unaware of small variations in 
state UI maximum benefits when deciding whether to apply for benefits, 
or that changes during the sample period are too small to generate 
changes in claiming behavior. Likewise, State implementation of ABP is 
a weak predictor of UI receipt for all but low-income workers, who are 
only marginally represented in our small sample. 
 
Our preferred model specification utilizes a binary variable indicating 
whether job loss was the result of a business closure as the IV. During 
the sample period, 8.1% of unemployment spells were attributable to 
business closure among those with data available on the cause of job 
loss; 44.1% reported quitting their job, while 31.0% were laid off.  
The rationale for our approach is that Federal UI rules imply that 
workers who involuntarily lose their job due to business closure (and 
other involuntary causes) are more likely to be eligible to receive UI 
than workers that experience job loss due to other reasons such as 
quitting without good cause or being fired. We assume business closures 
to be exogenous, as they themselves are not due strictly to an 
individual person’s characteristics (Strully, 2009, Salm, 2009, Brand 
et al., 2008).  
 
We use linear 2SLS models where the first stage equation takes the 
following form: 
 
UIi,t-1 = α + Xi,tπ + BCi,t-1Δ + S + T + URs,t-1 + εi,t-1   (2) 
 
Where BC is whether job loss occurred as a result of a business 
closure. In the second stage, the predicted level ÛI is then 
substituted into the original equation: 
 
Yi,t = α + Xi,tπ + ÛIi,t-1Δ + S + T + URs,t-1 + εi,t  (3) 
 
Where Yi,t is the probability that unemployed individual i would report 
poor health at time t. Effectively, this IV approach allows us to 
estimate the effect of UI receipt on the likelihood of poor health in a 
treated sample of unemployed workers with increased likelihood of 
receiving benefits, but whose characteristics do not differ from a 
control sample of unemployed workers who are less likely to be eligible 
for benefits.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix Exhibits 
 
Appendix Exhibit A1. Full model results 
      (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Linear 
probability 
model (full 
sample) 
Linear 
probability 
model 
(matched 
sample) 
Two-stage 
least 
squares 
(full 
sample) 
Two-stage 
least 
squares 
(matched 
sample) 
          
Received unemployment 
benefits -0.0466*** -0.0304* -0.300** -0.289** 
 
(0.0147) (0.0180) (0.139) (0.123) 
Poor health (t-2) 0.437*** 0.383*** 0.428*** 0.392*** 
 
(0.0184) (0.0327) (0.0162) (0.0268) 
Marital status 
(Married) . . . . 
     Marital status 
(Single) -0.00126 0.00184 -0.00810 -0.00539 
 
(0.0203) (0.0302) (0.0212) (0.0314) 
Marital status 
(Separated) 0.0655* 0.142** 0.0576* 0.141** 
 
(0.0352) (0.0672) (0.0331) (0.0580) 
Marital status 
(Divorced) 0.00348 -0.00413 0.00614 -0.0112 
 
(0.0214) (0.0303) (0.0217) (0.0319) 
Marital status 
(Widowed) 0.00130 0.00570 0.000943 0.00247 
 
(0.0284) (0.0449) (0.0272) (0.0427) 
Race (White) . . . . 
     Race (Black) 0.0173 0.00581 0.00590 0.00607 
 
(0.0155) (0.0240) (0.0171) (0.0244) 
Race (Other) 0.0142 0.0176 0.0305 0.0119 
 
(0.0311) (0.0408) (0.0325) (0.0400) 
Education (High 
School) . . . . 
     Education (College) -0.0438*** -0.0481** -0.0434*** -0.0494** 
 
(0.0148) (0.0220) (0.0160) (0.0235) 
Education (More than 
college) -0.0734 -0.0899 -0.115** -0.0804 
 
(0.0473) (0.0766) (0.0565) (0.101) 
Household size 0.0139*** 0.0136** 0.0148*** 0.0160** 
 
(0.00416) (0.00682) (0.00412) (0.00675) 
Gender (1=male) 0.00607 -0.00932 0.0139 -0.00883 
 
(0.0154) (0.0254) (0.0161) (0.0257) 
Natural log of family 
income (t-2) -0.000194 -0.0176 0.0101 -0.0209* 
 
(0.00476) (0.0110) (0.00766) (0.0113) 
Age 0.00471*** 0.00380*** 0.00426*** 0.00375*** 
 
(0.000591) (0.000891) (0.000647) (0.000902) 
State working age -0.00876 -0.00935 -0.00304 -0.00768 
unemployment rate (t-
1) 
 
(0.00561) (0.00880) (0.00656) (0.00915) 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     Constant -0.287*** 0.0827 -0.210 0.511*** 
 
(0.0820) (0.120) (0.242) (0.182) 
     Observations 4,247 1,750 4,247 1,750 
R-squared 0.237 0.197 0.184 0.098 
          
     
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Appendix Exhibit A2. Comparison between treated (unemployment benefit 
recipients) and control (non-recipients) among matched and unmatched 
sample 
  Mean      
Variable  Treated Control %bias % bias 
reduced    
T- 
test 
p-
value 
Unemployment 
benefit 
receipt  
Unmatched 1 0 .   . . 
 Matched 1 0 . . . . 
         
Health (t-2) Unmatched 2.4663 2.5999 -12.7   -
3.26 
0.001 
 Matched 2.4663 2.3966 6.6 47.8 1.43 0.153 
         
Single  Unmatched 0.28457 0.38642 -21.7   -
5.59 
0 
 Matched 0.28457 0.29029 -1.2 94.4 -
0.26 
0.792 
         
Widowed  Unmatched 0.03314 0.0516 -9.2   -
2.28 
0.023 
 Matched 0.03314 0.03314 0 100 0 1 
         
Divorced  Unmatched 0.17486 0.16815 1.8   0.47 0.638 
 Matched 0.17486 0.18286 -2.1 -19.3 -
0.44 
0.663 
         
Separated  Unmatched 0.072 0.08037 -3.2   -
0.82 
0.413 
 Matched 0.072 0.06971 0.9 72.7 0.19 0.852 
         
Black Unmatched 0.408 0.56524 -31.8   -
8.37 
0 
 Matched 0.408 0.39886 1.9 94.2 0.39 0.697 
         
Other Unmatched 0.072 0.03885 14.5   4.19 0 
 Matched 0.072 0.072 0 100 0 1 
         
College  Unmatched 0.25714 0.20433 12.6   3.39 0.001 
 Matched 0.25714 0.256 0.3 97.8 0.05 0.956 
         
Post-
Graduate  
Unmatched 0.00914 0.01601 -6.2   -
1.51 
0.131 
 Matched 0.00914 0.008 1 83.4 0.26 0.796 
         
Household 
size 
Unmatched 2.8617 2.7233 8.4   2.2 0.028 
 Matched 2.8617 2.7451 7.1 15.8 1.52 0.129 
         
Male Unmatched 0.68914 0.55813 27.3   7.05 0 
 Matched 0.68914 0.68571 0.7 97.4 0.15 0.877 
         
Total family 
income (t-2) 
Unmatched 10.217 9.5893 50.3   11.8
4 
0 
 Matched 10.217 10.237 -1.6 96.8 -
0.42 
0.677 
         
Age  Unmatched 40.425 39.561 7.1   1.79 0.074 
 Matched 40.425 40.437 -0.1 98.7 -
0.02 
0.985 
         
Working age 
unemployment 
rate in year 
of 
unemployment 
spell (t-1) 
Unmatched 5.0003 4.6444 23.4   6.14 0 
 Matched 5.0003 4.9074 6.1 73.9 1.27 0.204 
  
Appendix Exhibit A3 Comparison of reduction in bias before and after 
matching 
 
  
  
Appendix Exhibit A4. Balancing statistics between unmatched and matched 
samples 	
Sample Pseudo R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 MeanBias MedBias 
      
Raw 0.063 272.27 0 16.4 12.6 
Matched 0.003 6.4 0.955 2.1 1.1 
 
 
  
Appendix Exhibit A5. First stage regressions predicting the probability 
of receiving unemployment benefits 
     (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Full sample Matched sample 
      
Job loss due to 
business closure 0.158*** 0.257*** 
 
(0.0222) (0.0409) 
Poor health (t-2) -0.0339** 0.0306 
 
(0.0155) (0.0344) 
Marital status 
(Married) . . 
   Marital status 
(Single) -0.0266 -0.0205 
 
(0.0209) (0.0405) 
Marital status 
(Separated) -0.0333 -0.0127 
 
(0.0330) (0.0752) 
Marital status 
(Divorced) 0.00644 -0.0331 
 
(0.0217) (0.0412) 
Marital status 
(Widowed) -0.00590 -0.00849 
 
(0.0273) (0.0554) 
Race (White) . . 
   Race (Black) -0.0471*** -0.00521 
 
(0.0160) (0.0317) 
Race (Other) 0.0735** -0.0159 
 
(0.0314) (0.0518) 
Education (High 
School) . . 
   Education (College) 0.00481 0.00800 
 
(0.0161) (0.0306) 
Education (More 
than college) -0.159*** 0.0548 
 
(0.0520) (0.131) 
Household size 0.00335 0.0122 
 
(0.00411) (0.00864) 
Gender (1=male) 0.0269* 0.00425 
 
(0.0156) (0.0333) 
Natural log of 
family income (t-2) 0.0402*** -0.0163 
 
(0.00516) (0.0145) 
Age -0.00185*** -0.000281 
 
(0.000601) (0.00117) 
State working age 
unemployment rate 
(t-1) 0.0237*** 0.00920 
 
(0.00579) (0.0118) 
State fixed effects Yes Yes 
   Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
   Constant -0.426 0.116 
 
(0.397) (0.517) 
   Observations 4,247 1,750 
R-squared 0.100 0.086 
F-statistic 50.99 39.42 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
  
Appendix Exhibit A6. Comparison of business closure and other job 
losers 
  Business closure 
Other causes 
of job loss Total 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
              
Health (t) 2.660 1.081 2.717 1.154 2.712 1.149 
Poor health 
(t) 0.222 0.416 0.245 0.430 0.243 0.429 
Health (t-2) 2.567 1.063 2.579 1.082 2.578 1.081 
Poor health 
(t-2) 0.201 0.401 0.200 0.400 0.200 0.400 
Male  0.631 0.483 0.584 0.493 0.588 0.492 
Age  41.2 11.4 39.5 12.9 39.7 12.8 
Married  0.369 0.483 0.338 0.473 0.340 0.474 
Single  0.278 0.449 0.369 0.483 0.362 0.481 
Widowed  0.059 0.236 0.047 0.211 0.048 0.213 
Divorced  0.198 0.399 0.167 0.373 0.170 0.375 
Separated  0.096 0.295 0.079 0.270 0.080 0.272 
White 0.436 0.497 0.418 0.493 0.419 0.493 
Black 0.543 0.499 0.530 0.499 0.531 0.499 
Other 0.019 0.136 0.045 0.208 0.043 0.204 
High School or 
less  0.802 0.399 0.757 0.429 0.761 0.427 
College  0.187 0.391 0.228 0.420 0.225 0.418 
Post-Graduate  0.011 0.103 0.015 0.120 0.014 0.119 
Household size 2.805 1.651 2.751 1.655 2.755 1.654 
Total family 
income (t-2) 32202 36510 31746 41778 31783 41376 
Working age 
unemployment 
rate in year 
of 
unemployment 
spell (t-1) 
4.9 1.6 4.8 1.6 4.8 1.6 
 
 
